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In December 2015, a 42-year-old Danish man, John Salvesen, 2 burned a copy of the Quran, filmed himself, and posted the film to a Facebook page titled "Freedom Yes, Islam No." 3 In February 2017, a local Danish prosecutor charged him with violating Article 140, Denmark's ban on blasphemy. 4 This came after a decision not to prosecute the man under Denmark's hate speech laws. News of the prosecution spread rapidly and led to renewed calls for Denmark to abolish its blasphemy law. A key argument in the campaign was that Denmark, by continuing to penalize blasphemy, gave aid and comfort to countries, largely in the Islamic world, that punish blasphemy with draconian penalties. 5 In early June 2017, the Danish party abolished Article 1 My apologies to Queen. The message of the song, that "we're going to get you too" does parallel the momentum of the global campaign against blasphemy bans which is racking up repeals of Western blasphemy bans. Id. 4 Up to its repeal, Article 140 read as follows: "Whoever, in public, mocks or scorns the religious doctrines or acts of worship of any lawfully existing religious community in this country, shall be liable to a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 4 months." Taken from Lars Grassmé Binderup & Eva Maria Lassen, The Blasphemy Ban in Denmark, in András Koltay and Jeroen Temperman eds., BLASPHEMY AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: COMPARATIVE, THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL REFLECTIONS AFTER THE CHARLIE HEBDO MASSACRE, (Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 431-56. 5 For example, the May 15, 2017 petition from authors and journalists around the world makes this point. See Repeal Denmark's blasphemy ban -a I wonder about this story. Let me be clear: I do not support the draconian anti-blasphemy laws in effect in Pakistan and many other majority-Muslim countries. The End Blasphemy Laws campaign is right to target such laws, especially given their broad language, harsh penalties and use against minority groups. 11 On the other hand, three aspects of the mainstream narrative make me uneasy. First, I question whether the continued existence of rarely used, relatively mild 12 European blasphemy bans encourage countries like Pakistan, Iran (or Russia, for that matter) to enact and enforce draconian bans in a way that targets minority groups. To me, this is something one must prove, rather than something taken as a first principle. Second, any campaign against blasphemy bans should come to grips with the support such bans (even draconian ones) receive in countries like Pakistan. One does not have to accept this support as legitimate (it could, for example, be a form of false consciousness); but one should not assume that removing blasphemy bans in Pakistan will necessarily stop violent extra-judicial enforcement of anti-blasphemy norms. Finally, any campaign against punishment of those who denigrate religious symbols should also speak to "blasphemy" bans against secular symbols (such as a national flag). 13 Underneath these departures from the majority narrative are normative and pragmatic concerns. From a normative side, there is a virtue in getting the history, politics and sociology behind blasphemy and blasphemy bans right. In particular, this means developing nuanced arguments that transcend the culture war framework that debates on blasphemy bans generate -especially http://iheu.org/blasphemy-law-denmark-no/ (describing repeal as a victory for freedom expression and a vital change).
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For more, see Rob Kahn, Rethinking Blasphemy and anti-Blasphemy Laws, in András Koltay and Jeroen Temperman eds., BLASPHEMY AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: COMPARATIVE, THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL REFLECTIONS AFTER THE CHARLIE HEBDO MASSACRE, (2017) , pp. 167-93 (calling for a "liberalism of fear" approach to blasphemy bans which compares their use, severity and vagueness to other speech restrictions). 12 As noted above, the Danish ban is punishable by a fine or four months in jail. 13 In describing why Denmark's blasphemy ban (and prosecution) seemed out of place, New York Times reporter Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura noted that flag burning is not a punishable crime in Denmark. Freytas-Tamura, supra note 3. This makes one wonder about the United States. While the Supreme Court held that flag burning is protected speech, Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S 387 (1989) , the recent controversy over pro-athletes kneeling during the national anthem suggests that the United States is not as "modern" as we might think. See Sophie Tatum, Trump: NFL owners should fire players who protest the national anthem, CNN, (Sept. 23, 2017) , http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/22/politics/donald-trump-alabama-nfl/.
when Islam is involved. 14 At the same time, my concerns are also pragmatic. To be effective, the anti-blasphemy campaign should acknowledge the obstacles that lay in its path; otherwise, any progress it makes will unravel with the next crisis. 15 This essay focuses on five aspects of the debate over Denmark's repeal of its blasphemy ban, several of which undermine the commonly accepted story. First, the claim that Denmark properly abolished Article 140 because of its impact on Pakistan raises an empirical puzzle (was there really an impact?) as well as normative implications about state sovereignty. Second, the sudden emergence of a prosecution and repeal -after a century of Denmark's carrying on quite well with a rarely used blasphemy ban -reflects legal difficulties in prosecuting Quran burning as hate speech. To change Ronald Dworkin's idiom slightly, "Hard cases unmake bad laws." 16 Third, the failure of the Danes to prosecute those responsible for burning a Bible burning on live television in 1997 17 led some commentators from the United States to accuse Denmark of discriminating against Christians. 18 While one can always challenge double standards, burning a holy book of a minority group raises issues that "majoritarian" burning of holy books (such as the The uneven history of blasphemy law reform in Pakistan bears this out. Reform efforts often lead to a populist backlash. See Kahn, supra note 12?, at 191 (describing how law reform has been met by protests).
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Dworkin inverted this formula, examined the idea that hard cases make bad law. See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 REV. (1975 .
17
See Freytas-Tamura, supra note 3.
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DeGirolami, supra note 8?; see also Movsesian, supra note 8?.
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Flemming Rose, Why I Published Those Cartoons, WASHINGTON POST (Feb 19, 2006) . See also Robert A. Kahn, "Flemming Rose, The Danish Cartoon Controversy, and the New European Freedom of Speech," 40 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, 253, 272-73 (2009). nexus between blasphemy bans and terrorism. They do so, however, without presenting statistical evidence, or explaining how blasphemy bans encourage the commission of terrorist acts.
Finally, John Salvesen was not the only Quran burner facing charges in 2017. At the same time Denmark abolishing its blasphemy ban, a woman in Slovakia was facing criminal charges for urinating on a Quran and burning it; these charges, however, were brought under a newly passed anti-terror law. 20 The use of anti-terror laws to punish Quran burning, and other offensive speech acts, a somewhat depressing question: Has the antiblasphemy law campaign struck a blow for freedom of expression; or have we merely replaced one form of speech restriction with another? would apply to people of all religions --freedom of speech is inviolate; God does not exist, so no offense is possible. 25 These arguments, whatever one thinks of them, do not explicitly target Islam or the Islamic world, even if the blasphemy bans they call for removing exist primarily in majority Muslim countries.
There is, however, another branch of the anti-blasphemy ban movement that focuses more directly on Muslims -often combining opposition to bans with a broader sense of unease about the presence of Muslims in Europe and the West more generally. 26 These groups argue against blasphemy bans, an international norm against defamation, Sharia arbitration and the burqa by arguing that these policies represent a form of "submission" by the West to Islamic norms. 27 Submission is not simply giving into a demand; it is not compromise, or even appeasement. The term, as used in this context, has a religious flavoring; by requiring "submission," Europe, Gatestone Institute, (Nov. 30, 2012) , https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3474/blasphemy-laws-europe (describing issues involving nativity plays, promotion of dogs and proselytizing in an article supposedly about blasphemy). Other Gatestone articles, however, go much further. See also Guy Millière, "Muslim Invasion of Europe," (Oct. 22, 2015) , https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/6721/muslim-invasion-europe (describing Islam as a culture of the "formerly colonized," Muslims as "not wanting to assimilate" and drawing attention to "Muslim criminality in Europe").
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For example, the leader of the xenophobic Alternative for Germany party, Alexander Gauland, commented on the decision to postpone a school Christmas party after a Muslim student complained about singing Yet the End Blasphemy Campaign, in demanding that Denmark alter its penal laws to avoid giving Pakistani diplomats arguing points, appears to be demanding a form of "submission" as well. Instead of Denmark determining whether Article 140 best suits its needs (as it did in 2015-16 when it was out of the limelight), Denmark faces demands from the international community to play its part in the global soap opera featuring Islam vs. the West over religious freedom. In other words, Denmark is not simply being asked to join an emerging international consensus around blasphemy bans; it is being called upon to create this consensus, for the benefit of Pakistan and other majority Muslim that still have not seen the light. To be sure, the causation is indirect -Denmark is acting as Pakistan's mentor rather than its slave. But the sense remains that the developments in the Islamic world are dictating how a Western country should deal with a domestic political issue.
Is this a problem? There are good reasons to repeal blasphemy bans. So perhaps the Danes should thank the End Blasphemy Campaign (and, indirectly Pakistan) for doing it a favor and leading Denmark to do something they should have done years ago. Would we, however, feel as sanguine if the international pressure led to extending rather than removing a restriction on speech? What if a country without a blasphemy ban decided to enact one, not out of domestic political considerations, but because the international community told it to? To take an only slightly different example, many European countries adopted bans on Holocaust denial because of a 2008 Framework Decision inspired by Germany. Is this type of external pressure a problem, from either a free speech or state sovereignty perspective? 28 To be sure, there is a difference; Holocaust denial and blasphemy bans reduce speech. Repealing bans, therefore, is a good thing. Free speech, however, is not the only issue; there is also the question of Denmark's right to govern itself according to its own norms. Here the role of the international anti-blasphemy ban campaign seems more problematic. 32 Indeed, before matters came to a head earlier this year, the Danish debate over Article 140 turned on competing arguments based on the futility of change. Abolitionists argued that prosecuting a few Quran burners did not make society a better place; supporters of Article 140 made the same argument with the roles reversed -society is not improved by making Quran (and Bible) burning legal.
The status quo -a rarely used blasphemy ban -persisted because it satisfied both sides. On the one hand, it signaled that society would not give, as Danish Social Democrat spokesperson for religion Karen Klint put it, "a free pass to say anything we want." 33 At the same time, nobody was actually prosecuted and Denmark stayed out of the headlines. Article 140 was an especially effective status quo measure because it required provincial attorney general's consent, which made the law difficult to use and helped explain how the Danish cartoon controversy could come and go without blasphemy charges against Flemming Rose and the Jyllands Posten. 34 The February 2017 prosecution made the status quo impossible to maintain. Danes had to choose between having a blasphemy law and punishing concrete instances of blasphemy. The prosecution, in turn, was not -to take up a second point -a reflection of a lust for prosecution in a secular society, as some American commentators put it. 35 Salvesen fell in a gap between blasphemy and hate speech law, a circumstance that made blasphemy charges very tempting. 36 Here we should briefly distinguish blasphemy bans and hate speech laws. A ban on blasphemy focuses on an object, an idea, or an institution -this is one reason why blasphemy bans are rightly unpopular. By contrast, a hate speech ban (even one punishing incitement based on religion) concerns individuals or groups. While the United States has no hate speech laws, most of the rest of the world does. 37 These laws, explicitly mentioned in international legal documents, form part of a global consensus about speech regulation -rightly or wrongly.
Given these differences, bans on incitement to religious hatred represent an advance on blasphemy bans because they require that the speaker attack believers rather than beliefs. 38 Such laws also reflect the lived experience of some groups -Jews and Muslims -who experience hatred that looks religious at first glance but actually turns on ethnic or cultural characteristics. 39 If a country enacts a ban on inciting religious hatred, there is no reason for a blasphemy ban. This was the basis of the 2011 compromise in the defamation of religions debate and it covers most situations. 40 One of the reasons, however, the incitement standard works as a compromise is the tendency of speakers to engage in commentary that triggers a wide variety of legal provisions. We have an inkling about Salvesen's intent from his decision to post a film of the burning on an anti-Islamic Facebook page. This by itself may not be that convincing. But Salvesen's lawyer made statements that, while not part of the criminal act, say something more specific about Salvesen's motives and suggest why the case was so tempting to prosecute. According to the New York Times, the lawyer, Rasmus Paludan, described the burning as an act of selfdefense: "The Quran contains passages on how Mohammed's followers must kill the infidel, i.e. the Danes…. Therefore, it's an act of self-defense to burn a book that in such a way incites war and violence." 45 Inciting war and violence is a type of speech that even the United States lets the government punish. 
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banning "true threats." 47 That is not to say that a video of a Quran burning satisfies this test -in the United States, or elsewhere. But Salvesen's act, read in light of his lawyer's "explanation", looks like an attempt to breach the peace by triggering a war that, presumably, the Danes will win. This war, moreover, will be with Muslims who -if one takes the self-defense rationale seriouslywill be jolted by the video into taking actions that will justify a warlike response by the Danes. To the extent the video is intended to trigger Muslims, as opposed to critiquing Islam, the speech moves closer to incitement to religious violence which is punishable under traditional hate speech law. Still, because Salvesen did not say this in the video, hate speech charges under Article 266b probably were not justified. 48 Taken as a whole, however, the Salvesen case was well calculated to undercut the Danish truce over its blasphemy ban by presenting a case that -to some at least --a) was worth prosecuting but b) could only be prosecuted under Article 140. In this regard, Quran burning appears to be a distant relative of cross-burning in the United States, where Supreme Court justices have debated when a cross is burned with an "intent to intimidate" and when it is simply expressive activity. 49 Justice Clarence Thomas, writing in dissent, argued that given the history of the Ku Klux Klan, in the United States cross burning is always intimidatory. 50 Supporters of the Danish blasphemy ban might well might try to make a similar argument, namely that Quran burning, given its context, is intrinsically anti-Muslim (as opposed to simply a critique of Islam).
In making this argument, Danish Muslims can draw on evidence from Danish politics and society -evidence that goes well beyond Flemming Rose's call for cartoonists to draw Muhammad as they see him. For instance, they can refer to xenophobic comments of the Danish People's Party over the past fifteen years. 51 At the same time, this argument faces some obstacles. For one thing, Justice Thomas dissented in Virginia v. Black. The dominant position on the US Supreme Court requires proof that a cross was burned with intent to intimidate, something established on a case-by-case basis. 55 As noted above, the Salvesen case is pretty weak in this regard. Moreover, in drawing his tight connection between cross-burning and targeting African Americans, Justice Thomas could point to two centuries of slavery, a century of segregation and almost 150 years of Klan activity. 56 This is a deeper history than the history of Muslim migrants in Denmark, no matter how oppressive this recent Danish history is. Finally, while cross burning has no other purpose beyond racial intimidation (although Justice O'Connor, in her opinion, mentioned a cross burning at a wedding of a Nazi supporter and a member of the Ku Klux Klan), 57 someone might burn a Quran as a way to oppose Islam.
Compare these obstacles to a potential prosecution under Article 140. To make a case, the prosecution need not show a particular act of Quran burning was racist; it suffices to show that a Quran was burned in a way that disturbed the peace. One can see why prosecuting Salvesen was tempting, even as it broke up a societal truce over the status of Denmark's anti-blasphemy law. Kahn, supra note 57, at 77. Justice O'Connor also gave the example of a cross burned to express support in the 1960 elections for Richard M. Nixon, who had the decency -unlike other politicians --to reject the Klan's offer of support. Id.
III. BIBLES, QURANS AND CULTURE WARS IN THE UNITED STATES
The prosecution triggered a debate in Denmark about what to do about the law. One of the aspects of this debate focused on the 1997 burning of a Bible on Danish TV. This raised a question, especially in the United States. Why the double standard? If one can burn a Bible, why can't one burn a Quran? At the same time, these critics marveled at the existence of a blasphemy ban in Denmark -supposedly a modern, secular country.
For example, St. Johns Law Professor Marc DeGirolami, an expert in law and religion, expressed shock in a Commentary article that "blasphemy laws remain on Danish books" despite the fact that "the country is, by all accounts, very secular." 58 Claiming that when the Bible was burned in 1997, "nobody batted an eye," DeGirolami suggested that "what Denmark really needs is to refine its blasphemy laws -to give more detailed guidance about which religious texts may be defiled with impunity and which must be left alone." 59 Later, after noting Per Mouritsen's comment about taking religion seriously being the antithesis of good citizenship, DeGirolami jokes that Denmark might "adopt laws authorizing the state-enforced (but nondiscriminatory, of course) burning of all holy books" on a special day he called "Conflagration Sunday." 60 While there is an element of humor in his post, DeGirolami seems oddly bothered by the differential treatment of Christianity and Islam. He neglects to point out that the 1997 Bible burning led to an investigation. Nor does he mention that the Jyllands Posten, which ran 12 cartoons poking fun at the Prophet Muhammad, refused to run cartoons making fun of Christian religious figures. 61 Indeed, DeGirolami seems unable to decide what upsets him more -that Denmark has blasphemy bans or that it treats the Bible and Quran differently.
To take another example, Hofstra University Professor Mark Movsesian in a post on the First Things blog describes the February 2017 prosecution as a "truly singular occurrence." 62 In doing so, he 58 DeGirolami, supra note 8.
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The paper rejected the cartoons to avoid creating an outcry. See Gwladys Fouché, Danish Paper Rejected Jesus Cartoons, GUARDIAN (Feb. 6, 2006) Turning to the 1997 Bible burning, Movsesian speculates that "Danish authorities prosecute insults against Islam but not insults against Christianity," because "as a minority religion in Denmark, Muslims have more to fear from public mockery of their religion than Christians do." So far, so good. But after pointing out that he doesn't "approve [of] Quran burning" and describing his experience of feeling "deeply affronted, as a Christian, by the various public mockeries of my own religion that occur every day," Movsesian raises something he finds very puzzling. Why is "this particular anti-religious expression" (Quran burning) "out of so many others" targeted "in a secular, progressive, enlightened society like twenty-first-century Denmark[?]"
Movsesian is sympathetic to the argument that Muslims face special burdens as adherents to a minority religion but ultimately finds this argument "very puzzling." Once again, there is a tension between opposing Denmark's prosecution of blasphemy and a strong principled opposition to treating Bible and Quran burning as equivalent acts.
One response is to note another tension, one involving Denmark as a whole. It is commonplace to refer to Denmark as a secular society. On one level, this is true. Approximately 3% of Danes go to church each week; 64 less than a third of Danes believe in God. 65 At the same time, however, 79% of Danes belong to the national church 66 Yet if a society is culturally Christian, one might want to look at political acts -like the burning of religious books -through a cultural rather than a religious lens. In a country that is majority culturally Christian, a decision by someone raised in the faith to burn a Bible may be religiously offensive (precisely the type of offense supporters of the End Blasphemy Laws movement insist we should tolerate) but it is not culturally intimidating. The same statement targeting a minority religion will have a different, more threatening feel. Now this view can be taken too far. Members of minority cultures are not the only ones who can suffer from acts of hate speech; an Imam in a Copenhagen mosque burning a Bible could be threatening, especially if Christians were a minority in the neighborhood around the mosque. But, generally, burnings of religious books are more likely to strike fear in the hearts of religious minorities than in the hearts of religious majorities. 69 With this in mind, consider the response of Denmark's 7,000-member Jewish community to the calls to remove the blasphemy ban. While the 1943 rescue of Denmark's Jews is well known, the overall history of Jews in Denmark is a bit more ambiguous. 70 This has especially been true over the past several years, in which ritual 67 For a brief overview, see "Immigrants must Celebrate Christmas to be Danish": DPP, The Local (Feb. 7, 2017) , https://www.thelocal.dk/20170217/immigrants-must-celebrate-christmas-to-bedanish-dpp. Martin Henriksen, the Danish People's Party's immigration spokesperson, spoke about immigrants participating in "our cultural package," which includes celebrating religious holidays and visiting churches; this will enable immigrants "to see how it's done." Id.
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To continue from the previous footnote, the "it" referred to by the immigration minister seems more cultural than religious. slaughter and male circumcision have been at issue. 71 While there are humanitarian defenses of these laws, the commentary sometimes has an anti-Semitic tinge. 72 Not surprisingly, the Jewish community would up supporting the retention of Article 140. In particular, community leaders expressed "fear that the tendencies which have become particularly apparent over the past couple of years would be further cemented. The result would be a lesser protection and tolerance towards religious minorities." 73 Nor was the Danish Jewish community alone in opposing abolition of the ban. The Danish Muslim community opposed the ban on similar grounds and the Danish chapter of PEN, a human rights group, opposed immediate removal of the blasphemy ban preferring instead to conduct a campaign of public education to prepare the Danish public for the removal of the ban without unleashing a torrent of aggression at religious minorities. 74 According to Danish PEN: "If today there is indeed reason to be scared, we must urgently create an understanding for an abolition of the ban on blasphemy tomorrow." 75 Let me be clear. There is a strong argument that Article 140 is a poor way to protect religious minorities. Indeed, a compelling argument against speech bans of any type is that they will harm the disadvantaged groups they were intended to protect. 76 This seems especially true with a law, like Article 140, which targets ideas. Therefore, it may well be that Article 266b -along with Danish antidiscrimination law -already do an adequate job protecting the interests of Danish Jews or Muslims. Or more pessimistically: Even if religious minorities in Denmark are facing tough time, retaining Article 140 will not prevent Danish schools in Aarhus or Copenhagen from insisting that Muslim school children eat pork sandwiches.
Whatever the merits of these arguments, the vulnerability of Danish Muslims and Jews to oppression by a native Danish 71 For more, see Delahunty, supra note 55 (concluding that the ritual slaughter bans "does little or nothing to promote animal welfare and in fact is probably a reflection of Danish society's discomfort with the country's growing Muslim population"). Id. at 447.
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See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal, 1990 DUKE L. J. 484, 554-55 (1990 populace that is overwhelmingly culturally Christian is indisputable. The End Blasphemy Laws campaign recognizes that religious minorities (including Christians) face discrimination in Pakistan. Why is it so difficult for American legal scholars, who specialize in religion, to recognize that even a liberal, post-Christian society can discriminate against Jews, Muslims and other religious minorities? 77 
IV. REPEAL, TERRORISM AND THE UNLIKELY RETURN OF APPEASEMENT
Another odd aspect of the Danish debate over repealing Article 140 was how both sides handled the themes of terror and appeasement. Flemming Rose deployed the theme of appeasement repeatedly in defending his decision to run cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad. 78 Describing what he called " [t] he lesson from the Cold War," he warned his American readers: "If you give in to totalitarian impulses once, new demands follow. The West prevailed in the Cold War because we stood by our fundamental values and did not appease totalitarian tyrants." 79 It would have, or so it seemed, been relatively easy to cast the Salvesen prosecution and Article 140 as an example of the importance of not giving into the demands of Muslim terrorists. Yet, the terror theme was not often used this way in the debate over repeal.
Let me give some context. As late as 2013 a solid percentage of the Danish public favored retaining that country's blasphemy laws. 80 A criminal law commission, however, was appointed to look 77 For a discussion of the how American Christianity has defined itself against outgroups such as the Jews, see Stephen Feldman ed. PLEASE DON'T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS: A CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1997). Let me be clear. I am not suggesting that a Christian (or any other member of a religious group) is bound by the current understanding of church-state separation in the United States. To me as a Jew there is nothing inherently antiSemitic about being wished a Merry Christmas. On the other hand, the lack of sympathetic understanding about the perspective of minority faiths does not fit well with a commitment to restoring religion to the public square. 
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into the question of repeal. 81 Then, just before the commission issued its report, the Charlie Hebdo offices were attacked and, a month later, a talk of a Swedish cartoonist was broken up by gunfire. 82 There was a sense that early 2015, therefore, might not be the best time for Denmark to remove its blasphemy ban. 83 Indeed, Binderup and Lassen, reporting on the state of affairs in late 2016 concluded: "It seems that Denmark is caught up in the genuine dilemma that there is on the one hand a widespread and political agreement that Article 140 in principle must be given up, but also a sense that the timing of an abolition now would be bad and will probably, and sadly, remain so for a while." 84 In the weeks leading up to repeal, the Danish security agency PET warned that repeal would increase the risk of terror attacks. 85 While some supporters of repeal rejected the "security argument" as insufficiently protective of speech, 86 others questioned whether, as a practical matter, the repeal of Article 140 would make a difference given the lack of a reaction after the other countries repealed their blasphemy bans "without serious consequences." 87 Danish human rights expert Jacob Mchangama made a similar argument more abstractly: "trying to appease extremists" was "misguided" because "extremists, after all, do not care about the rule of law. Mchangama, supra note 10. To be fair, Mchangama also rejected appeasement as "illegitimate." But his need to supplement his principled point with a more pragmatic argument speaks volumes about the nature of the Danish center-right Venstre Party, which had always been divided on repeal, joined with the Green Party and the Danish People's Party to oppose the ban. 89 So, while appeasement was present, at least it did not triumph.
The part of the reason for this, however, relates to a second argument about blasphemy and terror, one raised by the global End Blasphemy Laws Campaign. On this view, removing Article 140 would reduce terrorism because blasphemy bans are themselves a major cause of terrorism. 90 For example, in a series of tweets celebrating repeal, the End Blasphemy Laws Campaign rejected the argument that abolishing Article 140 would promote terror as "deeply confused" and a "dangerous path." 91 It took this position because extremists also oppose other things, such as "sexual equality, LGBT rights, freedom [and] democracy," and outlawing these things merely because terrorists do not like them "will only lend [the terrorists] false legitimacy." 92 The series of tweets concluded with a call to arms: "End blasphemy laws! Resist terror!" 93 This line of argument is interesting for several reasons. For one thing, the main argument that blasphemy bans cause terror parallels one explanation for why Britain introduced blasphemy bans to India in the nineteenth century -a concern that Hindus and Muslims were "too passive." 94 If blasphemy bans exist, people are more likely to use them. In addition, blasphemy bans act as a signal that the society believes blasphemers should be punished extra judicially. All of this seems plausible. In the regard, it is not difficult to find evidence that the same countries that have and use anti-blasphemy laws -Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran -also have crowds that engage in extra-judicial killings of suspected blasphemers, their lawyers and indeed anyone who takes any steps to weaken the scope and power of such laws. Yet this line of argument has problems. First, it conflates riots and extra judicial killings in countries with draconian antiblasphemy laws with terror attacks directed at European countries. There is no logic that necessarily connecting these events. In this regard, the Charlie Hebdo attack may be the exception that proves the rule -i.e., the rare instance in which a blasphemy based motive is realized in a terror attack. While Denmark by repealing Article 140 might ease tensions in Pakistan, it is unclear how this will make a terror attack less likely in Denmark. There are strong reasons to repeal Article 140; avoiding terror attacks originating in Pakistan is not likely one of them. 96 Second, the argument has some weaknesses even as it applies to Pakistan and other majority Muslim countries. Let's assume that tomorrow Pakistan repeals its blasphemy bans, or -to make this more realistic -rolls them back to the weaker laws in place before Zia-ul-Haq took over. 97 What would happen the next day? Would Pakistan suddenly morph into a more tolerant, free society? Or would crowds start to form demanding a return of the laws and punishment for the government that repealed them? 98 Nigeria); Fiss, supra note 25, at 10 (describing extra judicial killings of bloggers in Bangladesh).
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Part of the difficulty with the blasphemy-bans-cause-terror argument is that its proponents tend to juxtapose the existence of blasphemy bans with evidence of terror groups (such as Boko Haram) without explaining how the laws create terror groups or make acts of terror more likely -especially terror acts with a global reach. For example, Khan describes "the meteoric rise of Boko Harm" as "the most explosive outgrowth of Nigeria's blasphemy law." Khan, supra note 96, at 12. He then goes on to describe the crimes of Boko Haram, and the government's use of censorship to punish critics of its anti-Boko Haram policy, id. at 13, without relating this directly to how the blasphemy bans (as opposed to other factors, including other forms of censorship) enabled the group's rise to power. (describing three weeks of protest brought about by a proposal to change the language Which one of these would happen is an empirical question (although recent Pakistani history is not encouraging). The argument that blasphemy bans increase terror and religious violence in countries like Pakistan may have merit, but it requires hard statistical evidence, or at least educated guesses about how this cause and effect relationship actually works in practice.
The question about how Pakistani blasphemy ban supporters would react to repeal (or moderation) of Pakistan's draconian blasphemy ban is worth asking seriously for at least two reasons. First, a campaign against blasphemy bans should show an interest in why, despite decades of opposition, such bans persist. This, in turn, requires theorizing about who supports blasphemy bans and why. Here, for instance, one might distinguish between opportunistic and sincere supporters of blasphemy bans. To the extent the key actors in a given society are opportunistic, then perhaps a change in Pakistan's blasphemy bans (for example) will encourage society to express their desire for power and attention in a different, less violent way. If, however, supporters are sincere, this outcome is less likely. 99 A second, more important, reason relates to human dignity. As we all recognize, the internet and social media place us in an increasingly interconnected world -one in which events in Pakistan influence Denmark, and vice versa. 100 In this world, it is too easy to view people on different sides of political, social, religious, moral or national divides as the enemy. This point is well known and oft repeated. Indeed, it is a tenet that many campaigners against blasphemy share. 101 However, if they really want to take the point seriously, they need to apply it to the mobs in Karachi or Islamabad who protest when a blasphemy suspect is released or a law weakened. We have written volumes about the Germans who in the concerning the Prophet Muhammad as part of the oath of office to benefit the Ahmadi religious minority).
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I am not suggesting the opportunistic vs. sincere dichotomy works in practice, only that it is an example of how we should think pragmatically and creatively about the prospects and impact of removing blasphemy bans in countries that have them -as opposed to assuming that repeal is something the international community can impose on Pakistan (or Denmark) with no internal opposition.
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Mchangama, supra note 10.
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For instance, the International Humanist Ethical Union, in its post celebrating repeal, faulted blasphemy bans for making it harder for "people to live side by side" and "marginaliz[ing] minorities." International Humanist and Ethical Union, supra note 11.
1920s, 30s, and 40s, supported Hitler; 102 why don't the angry mobs in Pakistan deserve the same attention? Are there strategies that will discourage them from protesting -strategies that are more direct than encouraging European countries from repealing their blasphemy bans? 103 V.
BLASPHEMY BANS BY ANOTHER NAME? THE RISE OF ANTI-TERROR LAWS Terror entered the debate over blasphemy bans in 2017 in a second, more troubling way. Just as the world was turning its attention to the spectacle of secular Denmark potentially punishing a Quran burner for blasphemy, a few hundred miles away another Quran burner was facing six years in prison. 104 The woman, Sheila Szmerekova's, burned a Quran after peeing on it -while a Slovak flag was in background. During the video she said, "'I will hunt you all step by step. No matter if it is a woman, a child or a man. I will bump off anybody who gets in my way." 105 Szmerekova was charged with hate speech as well as creating materials that promote extremism. 106 Her rationale for burning the Quran is unclear; she had been sexually assaulted as a teenager and had extremist comments on her social media profile. 107 The rationale for the prosecution is also somewhat unclear; while Szmerekova comments could constitute hate speech, the extremism charges have an eerily post-liberal feel to them, in large part because of a global move toward punishing acts of terror -including speech acts. MELA was founded in 2016 by a group of European scholars. While MELA hopes to come up with a list of "best practices" for the enactment of memory laws (both punitive and non-punitive), its mission statement also contains a recognition that punitive memory bans restrict freedom of speech. See MELA, About Us, (visited, Jan. 13, 2018) , http://www.melaproject.org/about. In the interests of full disclosure, I am affiliated with MELA as an external scholar.
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In Eastern Europe and Russia, things are somewhat different as memory bans have been used as an instrument of power politics by states to promote internal and external goals. See Koposov, MEMORY LAWS, MEMORY WARS, supra note 109, at 127-299.
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In early 2015, the government enacted additional laws that allowed increased government surveillance and in November of that year, after the ISIS attack in Paris, enacted temporary legislation that allowed the government to block
